Teixeira v Moaven [2026] EWHC 1215 (Ch): claims against estates, s.423 and limitation post-THG v Zedra
By Zachariah Pullar
The decision of Master Bowles (sitting in retirement) (“the Judge”) in Teixeira v Moaven and ors [2026] EWHC 1215 (Ch) (“Teixeira”), handed down on 22 May 2026, is noteworthy for several reasons. It provides an example of the uncommon ‘sham trusts’ doctrine in (successful) operation; it discusses (at [58]-[63]) the circumstances in which the personal representatives of an estate may be entitled (indeed obliged) to take an active stance in hostile litigation where the assets of the estate are at stake; it is Master Bowles’ – who has been sitting in retirement since 2018 – final written judgment.
Teixeria is also the first case, since the UKSC’s judgment handed down earlier this year in THG Plc v Zedra Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd [2026] UKSC 6 (“Zedra”) – which decided that no limitation period applies to unfair prejudice petitions brought under s.994 Companies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”) – to explore the implications of that decision for the application of statutory limitation to other claims, here under s.423 Insolvency Act 1986 (“IA 1986”), in the context of a claim against an estate for reasonable financial provision under the Inheritance (Provisions for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (“IHA 1975”). This obiter discussion is the focus of this Note.
Case overview
Abbas died on 16 May 2012. He was survived by his widow, Gabriela, and their two (then) minor children, Elis and Aryan. He left a will, executed shortly before his death, by which he left his residuary estate to Gabriela, Elis and Aryan in one-third equal shares.
In all the years since Abbas’ death, there had (save for a limited grant in 2021) been no grant of probate in his estate. This was mainly due to uncertainty about whether four London properties, of which he was sole legal owner, fell into his estate on his death. Roughly a month before he died, Abbas executed four documents (“the Declarations of Trust”) by which he purported to declare that he “held and holds and will continue to hold” those properties on trust in one-third equal shares for himself, his brother, and their mother, essentially formalising (so the documents recited) “long-standing arrangements” amongst them as to the properties’ beneficial ownership.
The case in the main ([78]-[190]) addressed Gabriela, Elis and Aryan’s claim that the Declarations of Trust were ‘shams’, containing a false report of history and designed to deceive the rest of the world about the true nature and extent of Abbas’ estate and prevent his wife and children from benefiting from the properties. The Judge upheld this claim. However, the Judge went on to consider – on the basis the Declarations of Trust were nevertheless effective as express trusts of land – their alternative claim, that the Declarations of Trust were (within the meaning of s.423 IA 1986) transactions at an undervalue entered into by Abbas with the purpose of prejudicing their interests in relation to claims they may (and sought in these proceedings to) make against his estate, namely claims under the IHA 1975. Unsurprisingly given his findings on sham, the Judge held he would have allowed Gabriela’s s.423 claim in the alternative.
Interestingly for present purposes, however, it was argued – following the well-known decision in Hill v Spread Trustee Co Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 542 (“Hill”), which held that s.423 claims were (a) subject to statutory limitation; and (b) ‘actions on a speciality’, such that (under s.8 Limitation Act 1980 (“ LA 1980”)) a 12-year limitation period applied, unless the 1980 Act provided for a shorter period, i.e., the six years applicable (under s.9) to ‘actions to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment’[1] – that Gabriela’s s.423 claim was statute-barred: since the claim was brought on 24 October 2025, being more than 12 years after the date of the impugned transactions (i.e., the Declarations of Trust), it was, on any view, out of time.
The Judge rejected this argument, holding (obiter) that Hill could not survive the decision and analysis of the majority of the UKSC in Zedra. However, in passing, he rejected an argument (based on dicta in the Family Division case of B v IB [2013] EWHC 3755 (Fam)) that, if a 12-year limitation period did apply, the clock only started when Gabriela could bring her IHA 1975 claim against Abbas’ estate; which, there being no grant of probate, she could not (as a matter of law) until October 2014,[2] before such point she could not be a ‘victim’ of the Declarations of Trust for the purposes of a s.423 claim. The Judge considered the fact that Gabriela could not immediately bring her IHA 1975 claim when the Declarations of Trust were executed did not prevent her from being a relevant ‘victim’ thereof as from that date.
Comment
Teixeira is, first, a reminder of the availability and potential utility of anti-avoidance claims to support an IHA 1975 claim. That Act has its own bespoke such remedy, contained in s.10 – but, as B v IB held, the existence of that provision does not prevent reliance (additionally or alternatively) on s.423, which may indeed be more advantageous: for example, it enables a wider range of relief; the court is directed to consider certain specific matters under s.10,[3] whereas its discretion under s.423 is at large; and whereas s.10 only captures transactions taking place in the six years immediately preceding death, s.423 has no such restriction – and, now, appears to be free from statutory limitation.
It is in relation to this last feature that Teixeira is instructive. Zedra was not a decision about s.423: however, in reaching its decision in relation to s.994 CA 2006, the UKSC disapproved much of the critical reasoning in Hill (most fully articulated by Arden LJ, who was in the minority, albeit not on the applicability of limitation): see Zedra at [117] and [155]. Whilst the UKSC fell short of overruling Hill, it is difficult to see how it survives the core reasoning in Zedra.
Like s.994 CA 2006, s.423 does not enforce a statutory obligation, but rather empowers certain categories of applicant to apply to the court for an order tailored to reverse (‘avoid’) a state of affairs, i.e. transactions made at undervalue for a prohibited purpose; and the court has a wide discretion as to what orders to make to this end (s.425 IA 1986).
This might be thought a welcome development, as Teixeira itself exemplifies in the context of an IHA 1975 claim. As Arden LJ explained in Hill (with which the majority judgment of Sir Martin Nourse, with whom Waller LJ agreed, is consistent, as touched on further below), the running of limitation under s.423 depended on there being a ‘victim’, i.e., “a person who is, or is capable of being, prejudiced by” the relevant transaction (s.423(5)), as this is part of the cause of action. But the few relevant decided cases evinced some uncertainty about when someone became a ‘victim’ of a pre-mortem disposition for the purposes of a s.423 claim advanced in support of an IHA 1975 claim. As above, it was submitted Gabriela was not a ‘victim’ until she could bring her IHA 1975 claim, which she could not until the law enabled such claims to be brought against estates where there is no grant of representation. The Judge ([204]) interpreted Parker J in B v IB (which also concerned an estate with no grant) as saying precisely this; but the reasoning on the relevant point in that case[4] is obscure. Parker J said this:
“[The Court of Appeal in Hill][5] held unanimously that it was not the policy of the Limitation Acts to allow time to run against a claimant or applicant before he was able to commence an action. Time only began at the date of the bankruptcy and not at the earlier date of the transaction sought to be set aside. I conclude that W’s claim is not time barred.”
In fact, it was only a majority in Hill that so held (Waller LJ concurring with Sir Martin Nourse); but this aside, the point appears to be that there is some relevant analogy between the making of the bankruptcy order in Hill, and the relevant estate becoming liable to an IHA 1975 claim by a qualifying applicant. It is suggested this analogy is not really a good one. The claimant in Hill was not a ‘victim’ of the impugned transactions in that case, but the trustee-in-bankruptcy of the individual who caused those transactions, who also has standing to bring a s.423 claim (s.424(1)(a) IA 1986). The trustee plainly could not bring his s.423 claim before his appointment, and so, for him, time only began to start from the date of the bankruptcy order; but (as the majority in Hill accepted) if a relevant ‘victim’ of the transaction had come into existence before that date, time for them would begin to run from the (earlier) date they were actually or potentially prejudiced by the transaction.
So that simply returns one to the question: in the context of an IHA 1975 claim, when does one become a ‘victim’ of a pre-death disposition?
It might well be said that a qualifying IHA 1975 applicant is not prejudiced (actually or potentially) by a pre-death disposition until the ‘debtor’ has died and the relevant estate has come into existence and is capable of being determined, and all/any bars to a claim have been removed. A potentially relevant analogy could be Arden LJ’s example in Hill of a person who enters into a voluntary settlement of all his assets before entering a risky trade, but who remains solvent for many years. His creditors would not (she thought) be capable of being prejudiced by the settlement for the purposes of s.423 until the debtor actually became insolvent.[6] In both cases it might be said the relevant (actual or potential) prejudice does not ‘crystallise’ until (as the case may be) insolvency, or the IHA 1975 claim is able to be brought against the estate. This was not, however, the Judge’s view, who would have held that limitation on Gabriela’s s.423 claim started as at the date of the Declarations of Trust, i.e. the impugned transaction (and, so, pre-death).
One reason counting against the Judge’s view is that it may compel potential IHA 1975 claimants to bring any s.423 claim challenging transactions by (e.g.) their living parents, or spouses, or person maintaining them, which may not only be deeply invidious for claimants but well before any IHA 1975 claim is even in their prospect.
Concluding remarks
These technical difficulties are, of course, avoided completely on the Judge’s (obiter) – and it is suggested correct – analysis that, following Zedra, no limitation period applies to s.423 claims. If delay in bringing the claim has any relevance, it is (as explained by the UKSC) to be subsumed within the overall discretionary exercise: Zedra at [170]. However, the full implications of Zedra as regards statutory causes of action will no doubt take some time to bed in; and it remains to be seen whether this aspect of Teixeira as regards s.423 will be followed in a future case where the issue needs to be decided.
[1] Although on the decision of the majority in Hill – that the limitation period began when the bankruptcy order was made, when was less than six years before the claim – it made no difference which section applied.
[2] I.e., when s.4 1975 Act was amended (by the Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Act 2014) to include the words “… but nothing prevents the making of an application [under s.2 1975 Act] before [representation with respect to the estate of the deceased] is first taken out”. It is, however, doubtful whether the law (pre-October 2014) did prevent IHA 1975 claims against unrepresented estates: see Antonio v Williams [2022] EWHC 2383 (Ch).
[3] See s.10(6) IHA 1975.
[4] See B v IB at [60].
[5] Ibid. It is assumed the reference in that paragraph to Hashmi v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2002] EWCA Civ 981, [2002] BPIR 974 is in error, and a reference to Hill was intended. Hashmi says nothing about limitation periods.
[6] See Hill at [125].